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1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
As former consular officers with decades of
experience working for the Department of State,
Amici Bushra A. Malik, Robert A. Mautino, Stephen
R. Pattison, William R. Rosner, Peter van Buren, and
Micah Watson have extensive expertise in visa application processing and in exercising discretion to fulfill
that task.1 Aside from work at Foggy Bottom headquarters in Washington, D.C., Amici’s postings
abroad include Accra, Ghana; Bangkok, Thailand;
Beirut, Lebanon; Berlin, Germany; Brussels, Belgium; Bucharest, Romania; Colombo, Sri Lanka;
Guadalajara, Mexico; Helsinki, Finland; Hong Kong,
People’s Republic of China; London, United Kingdom;
Osaka, Japan; Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Seoul,
South Korea; Taipei, Taiwan; Tijuana, Mexico; and
Tokyo, Japan.
Consular officers are defined in relevant part by
the Immigration and Nationality Act as “any consular, diplomatic, or other officer or employee of the
United States designated . . . for the purpose of
issuing immigrant or nonimmigrant visas.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(9). During their public service, Amici were
collectively responsible for assessing tens of thousands
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, Amici
state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or
in part and that no person other than Amici or their counsel
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
The parties’ letters consenting to the filing of this brief have
been filed with the Clerk.
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of visa applications, as line consular officers and in
supervisory capacities. Now, as then, they are interested in maximizing the accuracy and fairness of
weighty decisions about whom to admit to the United
States, particularly when U.S. citizens’ family reunification is at stake. They submit this brief to clarify
the role that consular officers and other government
actors play in the current visa-security system when
evaluating visa applications that may implicate
national security.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Certain visa application denials, particularly
those based on information originating from agencies
other than the Department of State, can be qualitatively different from denials based on consular discretion. Although the end result looks the same – “Visa
Denied” – denials based on database and watchlist
information maintained in the United States by the
Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and other
agencies, bear little resemblance to the traditional
exercise of consular discretion because the specific
information which requires the consular officer to
deny these visas is usually not available for him or
her to evaluate. Real decision-making in these cases
has in effect been ceded to the database and
watchlisting process, in which government agents
other than consular officers affix a label (e.g., “known
or suspected terrorist”) that is then used as a proxy
for consular judgment.

3
As a consequence, visa denials that rely on
database and watchlist information frequently involve no consular discretion and are compelled by
conclusory statements for which the underlying basis
is unseen and unevaluated by a consular officer.
Actions taken by the consular officer who adjudicated
Mr. Berashk’s visa provide a good example of this
paradox, as the consular officer’s initial prediction of
the visa’s speedy approval was made without awareness of what appears to be derogatory information
about Mr. Berashk contained in a database. Consuls
do not run mandatory name-checks on applicants
until after their visa interviews are completed and an
applicant is found to be eligible, otherwise, for visa
issuance. The discovery of derogatory information
against Mr. Berashk appears to have arisen from a
database, not from the visa interview. Shielding the
denial of his visa from judicial review, would, therefore, erroneously cloak database and watchlist entries
in the garb of consular discretion.
Judicial review should be available for visa
applications denied on grounds extending beyond
consular discretion, with appropriate restrictions to
prevent release of classified information. Judicial
review is especially appropriate when a U.S. citizen’s
family unity is at stake.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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ARGUMENT
I.

Petitioners’ description of consular visa
processing must be supplemented to reflect the changed nature of modern visa
security, which requires visa denials
based on database and watchlist “hits”
without genuine consular evaluation.

Petitioners’ brief presents an anachronistic
picture of consular visa processing, arguing against
“revisiting decisions about whether aliens who appear
before consular officers at far-off posts satisfy the
conditions Congress has decreed.” Petitioners’ Brief,
15 (emphasis added); see also id. at 34 (opposing
“judicial second-guessing of decisions made by consular officers abroad”) (emphasis added), 40 (describing
Congress “vest[ing] consular officers with the authority to make final determinations” about admission
(emphasis added)). This role description, while extremely familiar to Amici – capturing, for example,
how they routinely evaluated particular categories of
visa applicants for impermissible “immigrant intent”
under 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) – fails to acknowledge that
many visa denials no longer result from the exercise
of consular discretion as traditionally envisioned. Instead, many visa denials occur because officials at
other agencies make judgments based on information
available exclusively to them, which consular officers
– who themselves had no investigative role or authority to challenge that evidence – are unable to contest.
As a description of today’s system of visa application processing after the Homeland Security Act of
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2002, the traditional picture is outdated because it
omits the broad power of actors outside the Department of State’s consular corps to control the outcome
of visa applications. Point II below describes in detail
the database infrastructure underpinning current
visa security. Before reaching those particulars, this
section addresses the statutory framework that
altered how responsibilities for visa decision-making
are divided between the Department of State (DOS)
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Prior to the Homeland Security Act, consular
officers were the lead actors in visa adjudication. See
Stephen R. Viña, Cong. Research Serv., RL31997,
Authority to Enforce the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) in the Wake of the Homeland Security Act:
Legal Issues 1 n.2 (2003) (“The Secretary of State, the
State Department, and the diplomatic and consular
officers therein had primary authority for interpreting and implementing [INA] provisions on issuing
visas overseas, as well as having a role in implementing certain provisions that implicated sensitive
foreign policy concerns.”). Under the new statutory
regime, however, “all authorities to . . . administer,
and enforce the provisions of [the Immigration and
Nationality] Act and of all other immigration and
nationality laws, relating to the functions of consular
officers of the United States in connection with the
granting or refusal of visas” are now “vested exclusively” with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 6
U.S.C. § 236(b)(1). The Secretary of State’s residual
role has been preserved only for individual visa

6
“refusal[s] necessary or advisable in the foreign policy
or security interests of the United States,” 6 U.S.C.
§ 236(c)(1), as well as for particular foreign policy
provisions of the INA. See 6 U.S.C. § 236(c)(2) (retaining Secretary of State’s extant authorities, e.g.,
determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C)(i) that
an applicant’s admission poses “potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United
2
States”).
Ultimate authority to control the vast majority of
visa denials therefore no longer rests with consular
officers, who are employees of the Department of
State. Rather, it is the Secretary of Homeland Security who is vested with the broad “authority to refuse
visas in accordance with law.” 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1).
DHS’s authority to deny a visa “is exercised through
the Secretary of State,” id., and in practice through
consular officers at posts abroad, but an applicant’s
visa denial often has little or nothing to do with the
discretion conferred on consular officers by Congress.

2

For further elaboration of the post-Homeland Security Act
division of authorities, see National Immigration Project of the
National Lawyers Guild, Statutes Related to Visa Eligibility
(Jan. 6, 2015), available at http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/
legalresources/practice_advisories/Visa_Statutes_Chart.pdf; and
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
Visa-Related Activity Chart (Jan. 6, 2015), available at
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_
advisories/Visa-Related_Activity_Chart.pdf.
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In order to implement their dual responsibilities,
DOS and DHS signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2003. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 11 (Sept. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
News_&_Events/ADOS_DHS_MOU_re_HSA.pdf; Ruth
Ellen Wasem, Cong. Research Serv., R43589, Immigration: Visa Security Policies 17-18 (2014). The MOU
clarifies that “the Secretary of Homeland Security’s
authority to direct refusal or revocation of a visa may
be delegated only to DHS headquarters staff,” adding
that “[i]f the Secretary of Homeland Security decides
. . . to refuse a visa . . . [he or she] shall request the
Secretary of State to instruct the relevant consular
officer to refuse the visa. . . .” MOU, supra, at 8.
The MOU underpins today’s changed nature of
visa-application processing by, inter alia, implementing the Homeland Security Act’s provision for assigning DHS personnel to diplomatic posts. See Homeland
Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, § 428(e), 116 Stat.
2135, 2189-90. Today, there are 20 DHS Visa Security
Units (VSUs) abroad. See Dep’t of Homeland Security,
Office of Inspector General, The DHS Visa Security
Program 3 (2014). One of these VSUs is in Islamabad,
Pakistan, where Mr. Berashk was interviewed and
told to expect his visa in two to six weeks. See Wasem,
supra, at 13. DHS intends to expand its U.S.-based
Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence
Operations Team (PATRIOT), which “currently

8
screens visa applicants from the 20 VSU posts . . . to
screen applications for all 225 visa-issuing posts.”
DHS Visa Security, supra, at 8, 26. The very name of
this DHS unit – dedicated to “pre-adjudicated”
threats – reveals the shift away from traditional
consular decision-making that the new statutory
regime accomplished.
DHS describes VSU staff as “perform[ing] visa
security activities, which aim to complement the DOS
visa screening process with law enforcement resources not available to consular officers.” Wasem,
supra, at 13 (emphasis added). VSU personnel are
authorized, “as deemed appropriate by the Secretary
of Homeland Security, [to] provide the rating and/or
reviewing officer with input relevant to the evaluation of a consular officer [for mandatory] consideration in preparing the annual employee evaluation
report.” MOU, supra, at 13.
The MOU anticipated disagreements between
DOS and DHS officials regarding visa denials:
A DHS employee assigned to an overseas
post and performing section 428(e) [visa security] functions may recommend to the chief
of the consular section or the most senior supervisory consular officer present that a visa
be refused or revoked. If the chief of section
or supervisory consular officer does not agree
that the visa should be refused or revoked,
the post will initiate a request for a security
or other advisory opinion [SAO] and the DHS
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employee will be consulted in its preparation.
MOU, supra, at 11; cf. U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, GAO-11-315, DHS’s Visa Security Program
[VSP] Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and
Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide 15 (2011) (“VSP
and consular interaction has been difficult at some
posts, and ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] has provided limited guidance for such interaction.”). Amici were keenly aware during their service
that questioning the national-security basis provided
by other agencies for visa denials would not be well
received either by those agencies or their own superiors in the Department of State.
The process described in the MOU requires
consular officers to refer “selected visa cases for
greater review by intelligence and law enforcement
agencies.” Wasem, supra, at 10. These Security
Advisory Opinions (SAOs) place further constraints
on consular decision-making, involving the FBI and
other counterterrorism agencies, as described below.
The MOU provides that “[c]ases in which a third
agency to which such an SAO request is referred
believes that denial of a visa is appropriate and
DOS believes the information is legally insufficient
will be referred to the Secretary of Homeland Security to decide whether the facts support denial of the
visa in accordance with law.” MOU, supra, at 7 (emphasis added). In such cases, whatever discretion the
consular officer might wish to exercise is countermanded, and the officer ultimately issues a decision

10
that may not be based on his or her independent
judgment. Consular officers are not law enforcement
officials or equipped to investigate and evaluate all
adverse data that may be included in databases or
watchlists by other agencies. Consuls do, however, on
occasion encounter cases where the rationale for a
security-based denial does not seem rational or
persuasive.
In short, only by omitting the new reality of visa
decision-making can Petitioners assert that judicial
review in cases like this one challenges whether “the
consular officer reached an erroneous decision,”
Petitioners’ Brief, 53 (emphasis added). In fact, that
decision often is the product of information the consular officer has never seen, much less exercised discretion in evaluating, as the next section illustrates
through a real-life example. When evaluating judicial
reviewability in terms of “the exercise of the consular
officer’s responsibilities,” id., therefore, the Court is
faced with a much more diffuse set of information
inputs – and final authority reassigned by the Homeland Security Act to DHS – than the traditional
picture of consular visa processing Petitioners convey.
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II.

Judicial review is a necessary safetyvalve for visa denials relying on databases and watchlists that are compiled
with variable reliability by multiple agencies, several of which have no authority
over visa decisions.

Computers have revolutionized how information
is stored and used. This now-obvious point obscures a
subtler shift worked by the information revolution.
Decisions once made by consular officers “at far-off
posts,” Petitioners’ Brief, 15, based on their independent evaluation and judgment, now increasingly
rely on databases and watchlists maintained by
distant officials based in the United States. The
underlying standards used to compile these lists
frequently remain unknown to the end-user, who
nonetheless relies on their imposed labels. When a
consular officer abroad denies a visa because the
applicant’s name appears in a watchlist curated in
Washington, D.C. by DHS, the FBI, or a third agency,
such watchlist “hits” substitute for independent
consular decision-making. Even databases run by the
State Department are infused with information
vetted (and labeled with threat designations) by
outside officials neither trained nor authorized to
make visa decisions.
The perception among consular officers like
Amici is that serious questioning by a consul of
national-security-based
visa-denial
information
provided by another agency is essentially futile.
Indeed, the State Department instructs that where a
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DHS-generated basis for inadmissibility is discovered
in the Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS), the consular officer “must assume that the
finding was correct” and, except in cases involving
nonpermanent ineligibilities, “should not look behind
a definitive DHS finding or re-adjudicate the alien’s
eligibility with respect to the provision.” U.S. Dep’t of
State Cable, 05-State-066722, Processing Cases with
CLASS Hits ¶¶7-8 (Apr. 12, 2005), published on AILA
InfoNet at Doc. No. 05052060; 9 Foreign Affairs
Manual (FAM) 40.6 N.3.2.
When considering whether courts should review
“why the consular officer decided that [a particular
inadmissibility] provision was applicable,” Petitioners’ Brief, 52, it is therefore vital to understand where
“information in the government’s hands,” id., originated, and to keep in mind that the consular officer
himself or herself may well have no idea of the information’s content or reliability.
Consular officers have access to the biometric
and biographic Consular Consolidated Database
(CCD), which contains more than 143 million visa
application records; in 2012, the database also included more than 109 million photographs which are
used for facial recognition. Eleven Years Later: Preventing Terrorists from Coming to America: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th
Cong. 31-32 (2012) (statement of Edward J.
Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Visas). This database links with others controlled by
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DHS and the FBI that are created for purposes other
than visa processing.3 DOS also uses CLASS, reported in 2012 to contain more than 42.5 million records,
see Wasem, supra, at 9, including those of 27 million
persons found ineligible for visas or against whom
potentially derogatory information exists. Ramotowski,
Eleven Years Later, supra, at 31. “Almost 70 percent
of CLASS records come from other agencies, including
information from the FBI, DHS, DEA, and intelligence from other agencies.” Id.
A second layer of visa security, mentioned above
in the context of VSU personnel, is provided by DHS
databases to which consular officers do not have
access. A third layer comes into play when a case is
screened for terrorism-related inadmissibility purposes. Starting in June 2013, interagency counterterrorism screening applies to all visa applicants. See
Border Security Oversight, Part III: Border Crossing
Cards and B1/B2 Visas: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
3

“[D]atabases linked with the CCD include DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS) results, and supporting documents. In addition to performing biometric checks of the fingerprints for all visa applicants, DOS uses facial recognition
technology to screen visa applicants against a watchlist of
photos of known and suspected terrorists obtained from the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), as well as the entire gallery of
visa applicant photos contained in the CCD. The CCD also links
to the DHS’s Traveler Enforcement Compliance System (TECS),
a substantial database of law enforcement and border inspection
information. . . .” Wasem, supra, at 6.
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on National Security of the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 43 (2013)
(statement of Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services). In 2009, the
time period relevant to Mr. Berashk’s case, select
cases referred for a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO)
received specialized screening, drawing on the federal
government’s terrorism databases and watchlists.
The creation of such databases, and the dispersion of authority that they hide, began more than a
decade after the era of consul-centered decisionmaking that the Petitioners describe, see Petitioners’
Brief, 15; see also id. at 34, 40, and that the Court
considered in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972). The first terrorist watchlist was designed by a
State Department employee in 1987. It was a set of 3
x 5 notecards kept in a shoebox, which quickly grew
into a computerized system called TIPOFF, the direct
progenitor of CLASS. See Jeffrey Kahn, MRS. SHIPLEY’S
GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND TERRORIST WATCHLISTS
10 (2013). As computer technology advanced, databases
and watchlists proliferated. Id. at 135.
All of these systems suffered from the unwillingness of stove-piped federal agencies to share information. TIPOFF relied mainly on State Department
sources for its biographical and derogatory information; other agencies’ contributions were thin.4 The
4

Thomas R. Eldridge, et al., 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
(Continued on following page)
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9/11 Commission criticized this “culture of agencies
feeling they owned the information they gathered,”
and recommended reforms “to bring the major national security institutions into the information
revolution.” The 9/11 Commission Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States 417-18 (2004).
As a result, two new agencies were created to
centralize control of information. One, the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), was designed “to
merge and analyze all threat information in a single
location.” 149 Cong. Rec. 2033, 2035-36 (Jan. 28,
2003) (State of the Union Address of President
George W. Bush). The second, the Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC), was created to make, control, and
distribute to other agencies the terrorist watchlists
constructed from that information. Kahn, supra, at
149.
The TSC is a component of the FBI, staffed by
employees from many different agencies who operate
under FBI leadership. Id. at 148; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Management of
Terrorist Watchlist Nominations 29 n.62 (Mar. 2014).
United States 80 (2004) (“In 2001, the CIA provided 1,527 source
documents to TIPOFF; the State Department, 2,013; the INS,
173. The FBI, during this same year, provided 63 documents to
TIPOFF – fewer than were obtained from the public media, and
about the same number as were provided by the Australian
Intelligence Agency (52).”).
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Unlike the NCTC, the TSC operates solely under the
authority of presidential directives.5 It does not
provide direct administrative access or remedies to
individuals. Kahn, supra, at 189.6
The TSC assembles and curates the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB), an unclassified but lawenforcement-sensitive database that is comprised of
terrorist-related information submitted primarily by
the NCTC and the FBI. Information in the TSDB is
what the TSC uses to create and supply watchlists for
other federal agencies, such as the No Fly List
(Transportation Security Administration (TSA)) and
CLASS. The TSC also coordinates interaction between agencies using its watchlists and the original
information sources used to compose them. The TSDB
thus sits at the center of what one district court
5

See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11
§ 2 (Aug. 21, 2008) (“The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC),
which was established and is administered by the Attorney
General pursuant to [Homeland Security Presidential Directive]
6, enables Government officials to check individuals against a
consolidated Terrorist Screening Center Database.”). The NCTC,
by contrast, was established by Executive Order No. 13,354, 69
Fed. Reg. 53589 (Sept. 1, 2004), and later authorized by statute.
See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
Pub. L. 108-458, § 1021, 118 Stat. 3638, 3672-75.
6
See also Declaration of Christopher M. Piehota at 15 n.11,
Latif v. Holder, No. 10-cv-00750-BR (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2010), ECF
No. 44 (“The TSC does not accept redress inquiries directly from
the public, nor does it respond directly to redress inquiries.”).
Mr. Piehota is currently director of the Terrorist Screening
Center; at the time of his declaration, he was Deputy Director
for Operations.
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called the government’s “web of interlocking watchlists.” Ibrahim v. DHS, No. 06-cv-00545-WHA, 2014
WL 6609111, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).
The criteria for inclusion in the TSDB are rudimentary: “at least a partial name (e.g., given name,
surname, or both) and at least one additional piece of
identifying information (e.g., date of birth),” and some
“evidence of a nexus to terrorism.” U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-up
Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center 3 n.23 (2007).
What constitutes such a nexus is minimally defined.
As one TSC director apprised auditors, “to err on the
side of caution, individuals with any degree of a
terrorism nexus were included” in the TSDB if the
minimum necessary biographical data were available.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Review of the Terrorist Screening Center viii (2005). A
later TSC director oversaw the development of a
standard for inclusion, adapting the “reasonable
suspicion” standard from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). DOJ OIG Report (Mar. 2014), supra, at 3, 7.7
Notably, however, this standard is itself subject to
secret exception. Ibrahim, 2014 WL 6609111, at *12.

7

See also Kahn, supra, at 158 (citing author’s interview
with TSC Director Timothy J. Healy and TSC General Counsel
Jacqueline F. Brown (Dec. 4, 2009)), 302 n.10 (quoting from FBI
Memorandum, Counterterrorism Program Guidance Watchlisting
Administrative and Operational Guidance (Dec. 21, 2010)).
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As a result, the TSDB is enormous. In 2009, the
TSDB contained the names of roughly 400,000 people.8 It is certainly much larger now.9
Government oversight agencies have repeatedly
found fault with TSDB’s maintenance. The FBI
Inspector General’s most recent report concluded that
the FBI “maintained redundant and inefficient processes which hampered its ability to process watchlist
actions in a more timely manner,” including failures
to ensure that subjects of closed investigations are
removed from the TSDB. See DOJ OIG Report (Mar.
2014), supra, at 33. These findings followed previous
audits that identified “significant weaknesses with
the FBI’s management of the terrorist watchlist.” Id.
at 34.

8

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Watchlist Nomination
Practices 1 n.40 (2009); Five Years After the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act: Stopping Terrorist Travel: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Timothy J.
Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center).
9
Neither the TSC nor the DOJ Office of the Inspector
General has released a more recent statistic. However, the
National Counterterrorism Center that maintains the TIDE
system (from which most TSDB records are obtained) recently
noted: “As of December 2013, TIDE contained about 1.1 million
persons, most containing multiple minor spelling variations of
their names.” NCTC, Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment Factsheet (Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.nctc.gov/
docs/tidefactsheet_aug12014.pdf.
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The Inspector General concluded that “the FBI is
unable to ensure that all individuals that were nominated to the watchlist are appropriately removed
when cases are closed.” Id. at 56. Previous audits also
found high rates of error.10
These problems were all on display in Ibrahim v.
DHS.11 Ibrahim is the first, and so far only, bench
12
trial concerning terrorist watchlists. In January
2014, the court ordered substantial remedial
measures for all U.S. terrorist watchlists to correct
their erroneous inclusion of Rahinah Ibrahim. The
government did not appeal the district court’s judgment for the plaintiff, Dr. Ibrahim.
Dr. Ibrahim, a Malaysian national, lawfully
entered the United States in 1983 to study architecture. She married, gave birth to a daughter, and after
a decade back in Malaysia was completing doctoral
10

A DOJ Inspector General report issued in May 2009
concluded that “78 percent of the sampled investigations were
not processed within FBI guidelines. In 67 percent of the cases
reviewed the case agent failed to modify the watchlist record
when required by policy, and in 8 percent of the cases reviewed
the FBI failed to remove subjects from the watchlist as required
by policy. In 72 percent of closed cases the FBI failed to remove
the subject in a timely manner.” Id. at 87 (summarizing report).
11
Undersigned counsel Jeffrey Kahn testified as an expert
witness for the plaintiff in this case.
12
Other cases have proceeded based on stipulations agreed
between the parties concerning factual allegations. Consequently, no other court has made findings of fact concerning allegations raised in complaints about terrorist watchlists. See, e.g.,
Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1298 n.3 (D. Or. 2013).
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work at Stanford University in 2005 when she attempted to travel to an international academic conference. After arriving with her fourteen-year-old
daughter at a San Francisco airport check-in counter,
and requesting a wheelchair, she was arrested, handcuffed, and transported to an airport jail. Ibrahim,
2014 WL 6609111, at *6. Although allowed to travel
the next day, Dr. Ibrahim learned a few months later
that her student visa had been revoked. Id. at *7.
The direct cause of what the district court described as “the humiliation, cuffing, and incarceration
of an innocent and incapacitated air traveler,” id.
at *16, was an FBI agent. Agent Kelley nominated
Dr. Ibrahim to the TSDB and to several terrorist
watchlists about a month before they met at an
interview he requested. Id. at *5, *6. Dr. Ibrahim’s
nomination to these watchlists happened, Agent
Kelley admitted, because he incorrectly completed a
form used for watchlist nominations. Id. at *5. The
district court described the agent’s mistake as the
“bureaucratic analogy to a surgeon amputating the
wrong digit.” Id. at *16.
As a result, Dr. Ibrahim’s name began to ricochet
across various terrorism watchlists in “Kafkaesque
on-off-on-list treatment.” Id. at *18. This despite the
fact, conceded by the government, that Dr. Ibrahim is
not and was not a threat to U.S. national security. Id.
at *5, *19. The district court concluded that “suspicious adverse effects continued to haunt Dr. Ibrahim
in 2005 and 2006, even though the government
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claims to have learned of and corrected the mistake.”
Id. at *17.
Dr. Ibrahim received no explanation for these
actions; as noted, the TSC does not accept or respond
13
to public inquiries. Although Dr. Ibrahim’s name
was removed from the No Fly List shortly after her
arrest, her name remained on the TSDB, from which
it was added to the CLASS watchlist. Id. at *10.
Following Dr. Ibrahim’s erroneous watchlist
nomination, her F-1 student visa was revoked. Although the certificate of revocation noted that “information has come to light” indicating Dr. Ibrahim’s
possible ineligibility for her visa, id. at *10, the trial
record did not identify what that could be. Instead,
two e-mail exchanges revealed how the FBI agent’s
mistake ended up as the basis for revoking Dr. Ibrahim’s visa; the consular officials responsible for
handling her case neither contacted him nor knew
why he nominated Dr. Ibrahim to the TSDB. Instead,
the consular officials accepted the conclusion made by
unknown TSC employees (who processed the unknown FBI agent’s nomination), as a proxy for their
own decision-making.
13

Complaints about the No Fly List through the DHS TRIP
(Traveler Redress Inquiry Program) do not go directly to the
TSC, but to DHS. It is unclear how many traveler complaints
are forwarded from DHS to TSC, but this forwarding occurs only
for positive matches to watchlists created by TSC for use by
DHS component agencies (such as the No Fly List created for
TSA). See Kahn, supra, at 191-92.
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The first e-mail was sent the day after Dr. Ibrahim’s arrest. Officials in the coordination division of
the State Department’s visa office discussed their
frustration with a “stack of pending revocations” that
included Dr. Ibrahim’s:
I have a stack of pending revocations that
are based on VGTO [the FBI’s Violent Gang
and Terrorist Organization office] entries.
These revocations contain virtually no derogatory information. After a long and frustrating game of phone tag with INR [the
Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence
and Research], TSC, and Steve Naugle of the
FBI’s VGTO office, finally we’re going to revoke them.
Per my conversation with Steve, there is no
practical way to determine what the basis of
the investigation is for these applicants. The
only way to do it would be to contact the case
agent for each case individually to determine
what the basis of the investigation is. Since
we don’t have the time to do that (and, in my
experience, case agents don’t call you back
promptly, if at all), we will accept that the
opening of an investigation itself is a prima
facie indicator of potential ineligibility under
3(B) [Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)].
Id. at *10 (emphasis in original).
The second e-mail, dated a month later, was sent
by an employee in the State Department’s visa office
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coordination division to the chief of the consular
section of the U.S. embassy in Malaysia:
The short version is that [Dr. Ibrahim’s] visa
was revoked because there is law enforcement interest in her as a potential terrorist.
This is sufficient to prudentially revoke a visa but doesn’t constitute a finding of ineligibility. The idea is to revoke first and resolve
the issues later in the context of a new visa
application. . . . My guess based on past experience is that she’s probably issuable.
However, there’s no way to be sure without
putting her through the interagency process.
I’ll gin up the revocation.
Id. at *11.
The “law enforcement interest” was Agent Kelley’s incorrect nomination form. Once entered into the
watchlisting system, Dr. Ibrahim’s name was snared
by the “web of interlocking watchlists.” Id. at *7. This
continued despite the submission, a year later, of a
request by an unidentified government agent that her
name be “Remove[d] From ALL Watchlisting Supported Systems (For terrorist subjects: due to closure
of case AND no nexus to terrorism).” Id. at *11.
Ibrahim exposes two problems with databases
and watchlisting that directly affect visa decisions.
First, databases and watchlists have in some
regular instances displaced the traditional role of
consular officers in visa adjudications. A single FBI
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agent submitting a wrongly completed watchlistnomination form led to Dr. Ibrahim’s addition to the
No Fly List and the revocation of her student visa.
DOS consular officials deferred entirely to watchlists
created by officials from another agency based on
information from an inaccessible FBI agent. In Amici’s experience, this example typifies the postHomeland Security Act era. The FBI’s information
sources were unknown to the consular officials responsible for communicating a final visa determination to Dr. Ibrahim.
Second,
errors
reverberate
through
the
watchlisting system undetected or, worse, impervious
to attempts to purge them. As the district court in
Ibrahim commented: “Once derogatory information is
posted to the TSDB, it can propagate extensively
through the government’s interlocking complex of
databases, like a bad credit report that will never go
away.” Id. at *16. With specific reference to CLASS,
the court added that “bad information may remain
there and may linger on there” even if the original
entry in the TSDB is corrected or changed. Id. at *17.
DOS maintains its files, linked to past and present
CLASS entries, “until the applicant reaches age
ninety and has no visa application within the past ten
years.” Id. at *10.
Judicial review is therefore an essential protection to prevent visa denials based on erroneous
information. The mistake in Dr. Ibrahim’s case went
undetected until disclosed in a deposition ordered by
the district court, over government opposition, three
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months before trial. See Omnibus Order on Pending
Motions at 14, Ibrahim v. DHS, No. 06-cv-00545WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013), ECF No. 532; Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Continuance [Redacted] at 2, id. (Aug. 7, 2013), ECF No.
520. Her case – nearly eight years of litigation –
revealed what others refused visas lack the resources
and perseverance to expose: the inherent weaknesses
and flaws in the new visa-security system. None of
the remedial audits or other mechanisms for selfcorrection undertaken by the TSC and its customer
agencies uncovered the error on which so many
official actions were based.
The use today of numerous databases and
watchlists for visa decisions explains why the DHS
Inspector General described interagency security
vetting as leading to decisions often dictated to DOS,
rather than made using consular discretion: “After
conducting their review, the respective agencies inform DOS whether the applicant is eligible for a visa.”
DHS Visa Security, supra, at 7 (emphasis added).
This is a world apart from the traditional exercise of
consular discretion.
Indeed, there is no reasonable opportunity for
consular officers to exercise consular discretion once
a barrier to visa approval is erected by another
agency. Denials occur regardless of whether the
consular officer is completely in the dark about the
rationale (and regardless of whether the consular
officer might possess or become aware of information
that might mitigate or disprove inadmissibility, or
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could contribute to a fruitful line of inquiry to reach
that conclusion). In fact, DHS decisions in the U.S.,
based on TSC watchlists, on occasion override the
judgment of consular officers at far-off posts. Judicial
review for mistakes is imperative to ensure that
modern technology-driven visa processing does not
sweep aside American values of fairness and accuracy, shattering family unity.
III. The Court should hold that judicial review of visa denials is available where
there was no actual, legitimate exercise of
consular discretion.
As then-Circuit Judge Ginsburg underscored,
“[t]he Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens, but that discretion is not
boundless. It extends only as far as the statutory
authority conferred by Congress and may not transgress constitutional limitations. It is the duty of the
courts, in cases properly before them, to say where
those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.”
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir.
1986). The Court of Appeals in this case correctly
required the government to provide more information
regarding Mr. Berashk’s visa denial, in order to
ensure that the denial was lawful.
While the exercise of consular discretion should
ordinarily
receive appropriate
deference, cf.
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. 753, judicial review should be
available to examine claims that a visa applicant was
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incorrectly deemed inadmissible using information
beyond the purview of properly exercised consular
discretion. Drawing the line in this fashion would
greatly restrict the number of cases brought to federal court. Contrary to the Petitioners’ concern that all
112,405 visa applications denied under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) in fiscal year 2013 would end up being
reviewed, see Petitioners’ Brief, 31 n.10, DOS statistics indicate that visa denials susceptible to searching
judicial review would constitute a far smaller subset.
For example, only 28 immigrant-visa refusals under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) – the ground used to exclude
Mr. Berashk – were issued during fiscal year 2013.14
In each of those cases, if the inadmissibility ground(s)
could be overcome there is a statutory right for the
applicant to be issued an immigrant visa.
In this case, Ms. Din deserves a judicial accounting of whether a specific statutory ground of inadmissibility was properly applied to deny Mr. Berashk’s
immigrant-visa application. This is particularly so
because, as the government recognizes, “numerous
14

U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa
Ineligibilities: Fiscal Year 2013, available at http://travel.state.gov/
content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2013AnnualReport/
FY13AnnualReport-TableXX.pdf. None of the 28 ineligibility
findings for immigrant visas is listed as having been overcome.
There were also 591 non-immigrant visa ineligibility findings
based on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) in fiscal year 2013, 352 of
which were overcome. This may indicate a high error rate in the
initial findings which are then corrected, to some extent through
a waiver process available to certain non-immigrants (but not to
immigrants) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i).

28
provisions of the INA reflect a concern for promoting
family unity among U.S. citizens and their undocumented families.” Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 43, Texas v.
United States, No. 14-CV-254 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24,
2014), ECF No. 38 (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214
(1966), and giving as an example 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (placing no limits on number of
immigrant visas available for parents of U.S. citizens
older than 21)).
The mission of consular officers officially includes
“[h]elping U.S. citizens with family reunification.”
U.S. Dep’t of State, Career Tracks for Foreign Service
Officers, available at http://careers.state.gov/work/
foreign-service/officer/career-tracks. Moreover, given
the serious delays that loss of a priority date cause for
many immigrant-visa applications, careful review of
denials that are not based on the actual, legitimate
exercise of consular discretion is all the more necessary to ensure family unity for U.S. citizens in qualifying cases. Amici believe that visa decisions issued
by consular officers, the bread and butter of our long
careers, have consequences of a magnitude that
warrants judicial error-correction in an appropriate
subset of cases. For these reasons Amici respectfully
request that this Court preserve reviewability of
those visa denials.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully urge the Court to affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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